An Introduction to the Economics of Information: Incentives and Contracts. Ines Macho-Stadler, J., David Perez-Castrillo

An Introduction to the Economics of Information: Incentives and Contracts


An.Introduction.to.the.Economics.of.Information.Incentives.and.Contracts.pdf
ISBN: 0199243271,9780199243273 | 304 pages | 8 Mb


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An Introduction to the Economics of Information: Incentives and Contracts Ines Macho-Stadler, J., David Perez-Castrillo
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An Introduction to the Economics of Information. Empirical issues in Economics of Information. " Hierarchical Decentralization of Incentive Contracts" (with N. Incentives and contract theory were largely ignored by economists until the end of the. Keywords: Incentive Contracts, Moral Hazard, Fairness, Reciprocity, School of Economics, the University of Munich, Oxford University, Stanford I. Oxford University Press, 2nd edition, 2001. North-Holland the theory of incentives was born in the 1960s when information constraints were introduced. Agent gives the agent access to private information about the technology. Feasible contracts: now contracts must be not only 'incentive compatible' but. An introduction to the economics of information: incentives and contracts. European Economic Review 34 (1990) 303-310. He introduced the Spence–Mirrlees condition and derived the . NSF grant for a study of "Incentive and Information Issues in Iterative .